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COMMENTS
MEXICAN AMERICANS: ARE THEY PROTECTED
BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866?
INTRODUCTION
In 1968, in the landmark case of Jones v. Alfred Mayer
Co.,1 the United States Supreme Court held that section 1982
of Title 42' of the United States Code which provides that all
citizens have the same right to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property,"' prohibits pri-
vate racial discrimination with respect to the rights enumer-
ated in the statute. The Court's holding was soon extended to
include section 1981 of Title 42' in Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency. 6 In Johnson, the Court held that section 1981
provided a remedy against racial discrimination in private
employment.7 Essentially, section 1981 provides that all per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States have the
same right to make and enforce contracts.' Both sections were
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that was passed
pursuant to Congress' power under the thirteenth amendment
to the Constitution.'
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1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property.
3. Id.
4. 392 U.S. at 436.
5. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceeding for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction of every kind and no other.
6. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
7. Id. at 459-60.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII provides:
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These decisions transformed the century-old and dor-
mant Civil Rights Act of 1866 into a viable tool for combat-
ting private racial discrimination despite the developments in
fourteenth amendment equal protection doctrine and the
presence of Title II and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The reasons for this renewed vitality are clear: sections
1981 and 1982 are considerably more inclusive than their
modern-day counterparts. In substantive terms, they are
broader in both scope of coverage and in types of relief ob-
tainable. Procedurally, sections 1981 and 1982 provide longer
statutes of limitations and less stringent exhaustion of reme-
dies requirements.1 0
Mexican American citizens, however, who have encoun-
tered severe deprivation of civil rights in the United States,"
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.
10. The prohibitive provisions of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e, -2, 3) are applica-
ble only to employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations while section
1981 has been read by at least some courts to include all persons who interfere with
contracting on racial grounds. WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp.
57 (M.D. Ala. 1973). Moreover, section 1981 applies to the making of all contracts,
not only those related to employment. Under Title VII, the defendant-employer must
have at least fifteen employees to come within the scope of the Act; section 1981 does
not have such a requirement. Under section 1981, the aggrieved individual need not
exhaust the administrative remedies required under Title VII. Johnson v. Railway
Transp. Co., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Furthermore, the type of relief obtainable under
section 1981 is substantially broader than that under Title VII. The Court in John-
son declared that under section 1981 the plaintiff was entitled to "both equitable and
legal relief, including compensatory, and in certain circumstances, punitive damages
.... Id. at 460. Title VII, on the other hand makes no provision for the recovery of
compensatory or punitive damages, except for back pay for a period of two years
prior to the violation.
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. section 1982, in providing that "all citizens of the United
States shall have the same right. . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property," 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), presumably places no restriction
on the type of property within the ambit of the statute. On the other hand, the cover-
age of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31 (1976), and Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976), is substantially narrower.
For example, Title VIII extends only to dwellings and lots upon which dwellings may
be built. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(b), 3603, 3604 (1976). More importantly, owners of single-
family dwellings, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1976), or buildings with four or fewer dwell-
ing units, id. (b)(2), are exempt from coverage. Title II primarily involves personal
property transactions but was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the com-
merce clause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976). This creates an impediment to the full and
beneficial use of this statute as a means of civil rights protection.
11. For an examination of the discrimination which Mexican Americans have
MEXICAN AMERICANS
have not necessarily been afforded the protection of the broad
proscriptions of sections 1981 and 1982. The Supreme Court,
in dicta, has limited the proscriptions of these sections to
racial discrimination only."' This standard, when applied to
Mexican American plaintiffs, has resulted in a confusing array
of lower court opinions.
Some district courts have allowed Mexican Americans, or
other Hispanic persons, to proceed under sections 1981 and
1982 only if they can prove that the discrimination was ra-
cially motivated.18 A few courts have held that Mexican Amer-
icans may sue for national origin discrimination." Others have
held that persons of Hispanic origin have no cause of action
on either theory under sections 1981 or 1982.15 And some
lower courts have recognized a practical and logical reason to
extend the protection of these sections to Mexican Americans
in order to ensure that they, as a group, enjoy the same pro-
tection as the "white majority.0 6
The purpose of this comment is to determine the extent
of protection afforded Mexican Americans by sections 1981
and 1982 of the United States Code. The comment will
demonstrate that the framers of sections 1981 and 1982 envi-
sioned broad and far-reaching remedies under the statutes in
the area of civil rights and did not intend to limit their appli-
cation to racial discrimination alone. Rather, they intended
that these statutes would afford a remedy to any person who
was discriminated against because he or she was not a mem-
ber of the historically most-favored group, white citizens.
faced, see Greenfield and Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CA". L. Rzv. 662, 710-30 (1976).
12. In Jones the court stated that "the statute in this case [§ 1982] deals only
with racial discrimination and does not address itself to discrimination on grounds of
religion or national origin." 392 U.S. at 413.
13. See, e.g., Garcia v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 80 F.R.D.
254 (N.D. I1. 1978); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Local 130, 452 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. IM. 1978); Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901 (W.D.
Okla. 1977); Martinez v. Hazelton Research Animals, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 186 (D. Ariz.
1976); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
14. See, e.g., Miranda v. Clothing Workers Local 208, 10 FEP Cases 557 (D.N.J.
1974); Sud v. Import Motors Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1064 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
15. See, e.g., Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
16. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. International Bhd. Elec. Workers, 466 F. Supp. 595
(N.D. Ill. 1979); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979); La
Fore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co., 448 F. Supp. 824 (D. Colo. 1978); Ortega v. Merit
Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. 111. 1977).
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THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT-BROADER THAN RACIAL CLASSES
Senate Bill No. 61
Both section 1981 and section 1982 originated in the Civil
Rights Act of April 9, 1866,17 that was passed pursuant to
Congress' power under section 2 of the thirteenth amend-
ment."8 On January 5, 1866, Senator Trumbull of Illinois in-
troduced Senate Bill No. 61, later to become the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, as a bill "designed to protect all persons in the
United States in their civil rights and furnish the means of
their vindication. '"1 9 The Senator later described the relation-
ship between his bill and the thirteenth amendment: "That
amendment declared that all persons in the United States
should be free. This measure is intended to give effect to that
declaration and secure to all persons within the United States
practical freedom."20 With this historical setting in mind, the
focus of the inquiry must now shift to a consideration of the
forms of discrimination prohibited by the statutes.
Mexican Americans: What Color?
Before 1976 and the Supreme Court's decision in McDon-
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 21 lower courts were
split on the issue of the applicability of sections 1981 and
1982 to persons other than blacks. In McDonald, the plaintiffs
were white employees of Santa Fe who were discharged for
misappropriating cargo from one of the company's shipments.
17. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided in relevant part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any for-
eign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citi-
zens of the United States; and such citizens, or every race and color,
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right in every State and Terri-
tory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceeding for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penal-
ties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
18. For the text of the thirteenth amendment see note 9 supra.
19. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Ses. 129 (1866).
20. Id. at 474.
21. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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A black employee, also charged with the same offense, was not
discharged. The Court held that the plaintiffs had stated a
cause of action under section 1981 in that the section prohib-
ited racial discrimination against white as well as non-white
persons.2 2
In so ruling, the Court answered the question of who
could be protected by the statutes: any person, white or non-
white, can bring suit for a violation of section 1981. At first
glance, this would seem to answer the question of whether
Mexican Americans have a cause of action under the statutes.
The Court in McDonald, however, held simply that whites
and non-whites are protected from racial discrimination by
section 1981. This holding is problematic. Are Mexican Amer-
icans "white" for the purposes of sections 1981 and 1982 who
must accordingly be discriminated against as members of the
"white" race in order to maintain a cause of action? Since
they clearly are not black, would the Court view Mexican
Americans as a separate race? 28 Or is the Court's assumption
that racial discrimination is the only form of prohibited dis-
crimination under sections 1981 and 1982 inaccurate?
"As is Enjoyed by White Citizens" and the Racial Character
of Rights' Protection
The conclusion that sections 1981 and 1982 bar only ra-
cial discrimination is derived primarily from the phrase "as is
enjoyed by white citizens" that appears both in the Civil
Rights Act of 18661" and in sections 1981 and 1982.' 5 In Geor-
gia v. Rachel,2' the Court read this phrase as describing the
"racial character of the rights being protected' 7 by the stat-
utes. This reading was reaffirmed by the Court in McDonald
when it disregarded the argument that this phrase necessarily
excluded whites from protection under the statute. The Court
reasoned:
22. Id. at 296.
23. The lower court holdings on this issue are quite diverse and interesting.
Compare Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (Mexi-
can Americans should be pragmatically deemed a race for purposes of section 1981)
with Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 448 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (not prepared
to find that Hispanic persons are a separate race for purposes of section 1981).
24. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
25. For text of statutes, see notes 2 & 5 supra.
26. 384 U.S. 780 (1968).
27. Id. at 791.
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While a mechanical reading of the phrase "as is enjoyed
by white citizens" would seem to lend support to respon-
dents' reading of the statute [that whites are excluded
from coverage], we have previously described this phrase
as emphasizing "the racial character of the rights being
protected."28
The Court's reliance on the phrase "as is enjoyed by
white citizens" is misplaced when used for the proposition
that racial discrimination alone is prohibited by sections 1981
and 1982 of Title 42. As detailed below, an inquiry into the
meaning that Congress attributed to these words when it
drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reveals that the words
were regarded as superfluous; they neither add nor detract
from the otherwise "color-neutral" language of the bill. Thus,
the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" forms no basis for
concluding that the statutes protect rights of a racial charac-
ter only.
Representative Wilson offered the phrase "as is enjoyed
by white citizens" as an amendment to Senate Bill No. 61."
During the Senate debate on the new House version of the
bill, Senator Van Winkle offered this criticism of the added
phrase:80
The clause commences with the words "and such citi-
zeAs." As I understand these words, they include all per-
sons who are or can be citizens, white persons and all
others. The clause then goes on to provide that "such citi-
zens of every race and color, without regard to any previ-
ous condition of servitude, shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts," &c "'as is enjoyed by white
citizens." It seems to me that these words are superflu-
ous. The idea is that the rights of all persons shall be
equal; and I think leaving out these words would attain
the object.81
Senator Trumbull, the author of the bill, agreed with Van
Winkle's assessment that the added language was
unnecessary.8 '
28. 427 U.S. 273, 287 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 781 (1966)).
29. CONG. GLOBE, .39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
30. Senator VanWinkle was referring to the second clause of the Act which be-
gins "and such citizens" and ends with "as is enjoyed by white citizens."
31. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1413 (1866) (emphasis added).
32. d.
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Nowhere in the debates was there reference to the idea
that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" limited the
rights being protected to racially oriented rights. In light of
the prevailing view that the phrase was superfluous, it would
be difficult to argue that these words alone limit the applica-
tion of sections 1981 and 1982 to racial discrimination.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the issue of whether the scope of the stat-
utes extend beyond racial discrimination. The cases wherein
the Supreme Court, in dicta, limited the form of prohibited
discrimination to racial discrimination were simply set in a
black/white context.
For example, in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,33 the plaintiff
was a Negro who had been refused housing by whites because
of his race. In McDonald, the plaintiff was a white male who
was discharged for misappropriating his employer's cargo
while two black employees, guilty of the same conduct, were
not. And in Georgia v. Rachel," the respondent blacks were
arrested when they sought service in a whites-only Georgia
restaurant. Rachel, the case most often cited for the proposi-
tion that the statutes protect only racial rights, did not di-
rectly involve either section 1981 or 1982. Instead, it was a
case in which the defendants sought removal to federal court
under section 1443(1) of Title 28 6 that provides for such re-
moval jurisdiction when the action is "[a]gainst any person
who is denied or cannot enforce" in the state courts "a right
under any law providing for. . . equal civil rights."'" Inciden-
tal to the holding that removal was proper, the Court noted
that section 1981 protected racial rights and therefore pro-
vided for "equal civil rights."
Thus, in each of the cases noted above, the statement
that the statute prohibited racial discrimination flowed natu-
rally from the black/white factual situation. The Court was
not called upon to examine the full effect that the limitation
to racial discrimination would have.' It was perhaps an un-
33. 392 U.S. 409.
34. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
35. Id. at 783.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1970).
37. Evidence that the courts may assume that Mexican Americans are victims
of "racial" discrimination, or at least, that they are proper plaintiffs under section
1981, is found in East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
19801 895
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examined assumption that this statute would extend to all
groups pragmatically or commonly deemed to be a separate
race. Nevertheless, many lower courts have interpreted the
dicta of Jones, McDonald and Rachel as excluding all other
forms of discrimination from the statutes' purview.88
At least one lower court, however, has not adopted the
dicta so readily. In Lafore v. Emblem Tape and Label Co.,"s
the district court rejected the contention that the phrase in
question set up a racial standard for unlawful discrimination.
In that case, the Mexican American plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant company under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and section 1981 for employment discrimina-
tion based on race, color, and national origin. The court held
that LaFore had stated a cause of action under section 1981.
The opinion emphasized that "[e]quating 'white citizens' with
a racial classification is utterly lacking in sophistication.
There is no scientific justification for the equation and its use
inevitably leads to irretrievable confusion."40 The court rea-
soned further that:
If we understand the term "white citizen" in the statute
to mean that group which was most favored, the rule be-
comes understandable. All persons are entitled to the
same rights and benefits as the most favored class. "1
(1977). In that case, Mexican American plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of
Mexican American and black employees under Title VII and section 1981. Although
the Supreme Court vacated the fifth circuit's certification of the class, it did not do so
on the ground that Mexican Americans cannot bring suit under section 1981. If it was
a firm ruling of the Court that Mexican Americans are not proper plaintiffs under
section 1981, the Court presumably would have so stated in its decision.
38. The following cases have held that national origin discrimination is not cov-
ered by the statutes: Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical & Diagnostic Center, 467 F.
Supp. 103 (D.C. Minn. 1976); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers, 452 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. IM. 1978); Saad v. Burns Int'l Secretarial Services, Inc., 456 F.
Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1978); Mouriz v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D.
La. 1977); Budinsky v. Coming Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
Kruylas v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 373 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1974);
Kerckhoff v. Kerckhoff, 369 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Marshall v. Plumbers &
Steam Fitters Local 70, 343 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. La. 1972). Furthermore, when the issue
of whether sex discrimination is prohibited by sections 1981 and 1982 has arisen, the
following courts have responded that they apply solely to racial discrimination: Clark
v. Morgan's Austintown Foods, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Ohio 1976); Johnson v.
University of Pittsburg, 405 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Pa. 1976); League of Academic Wo-
men v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
39. 448 F. Supp. 824 (D. Colo. 1978).
40. Id. at 826.
41. Id.
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"White Citizens": The White Majority
The legislative intent of the framers of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was to protect the rights of those classes of citi-
zens who historically had been deprived of the civil rights ac-
corded the favored "white citizens," or more precisely the
original incorporators of the United States, the Europeans.
Under this reading of the statute, Mexican Americans, tradi-
tional victims of class-based discrimination, necessarily fall
within the protection of the statutes.
Evidence that the legislative intent extended beyond the
elimination of racial discrimination can be found in state-
ments made by opponents of the 1866 Act. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, in addition to providing equality of civil rights to
all citizens, bestowed citizenship upon all persons born in the
United States, excluding non-taxed Indians. Senator Cowan
expressed great fear that this grant would have the effect of
making citizens of, and giving civil rights to, the "barbarian
races"-the Chinese and the Gypsies. He stated:
[I]f they are to be made citizens and enjoy political power
in California, then sir, the day may not be very far distant
when, California, instead of belonging to the European
race, may belong to the Mongolian, may belong to the
Chinese."
Senator Trumbull, the bill's author, maintained that the Act
would "undoubtedly" have the effect of naturalizing the chil-
dren of Chinese and Gypsies born in the United States for the
"law makes no such distinction; and the child of an Asiatic is
just as much a citizen as the child of a European."" Trum-
bull also noted:
We are passing a law declaratory of what, in my judgment
the law now is; and for that reason I think it better to
retain the words "without distinction of color" that there
be no dispute that the word "persons" means
everybody."
The statements above set forth a clear distinction be-
tween the European incorporators of the colonies and all
others. The belief that the Trumbull bill would give civil
42. CONG. GLOGE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1866) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
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rights to "all others" indicates that the discrimination at
which the Act was aimed was not just racially-based but all-
class based. That is, the protections are activated whenever a
class of people is treated differently from the "white" citi-
zenry. The standard for civil rights is that accorded to the Eu-
ropean incorporators, the white majority, and any deprivation
of civil rights in violation of this standard suffered by a mem-
ber of an ethnic group which has suffered widespread discrim-
ination would give rise to a cause of action.
While it is true that the Senators frequently used the
word "race" when referring to different ethnic groups, one
should be careful to note that the word was used in an archaic
and non-scientific sense. This is apparent from the record of
the Senate debate. Senator Cowan, an opponent of the Trum-
bull bill, asked,
[W]hat is meant by the word "race," and where [is it] set-
tled that there are two races of men, and if it is settled
that there are two or more, how many? Where is the line
to be drawn? What constitutes the distinctive characteris-
tics and marks which limit and bound these races?... I
only notice [this] as an indication of the loose manner in
which we legislate about these subjects."
Moreover, Trumbull's concern about retaining the words
"without distinction of color"" evinces a concern that extends
beyond clear racial discrimination. Since there was no discus-
sion in the Senate about eliminating the words "without dis-
tinction of race" and they presumably would have remained
in the Act, Trumbull was obviously concerned about those
who may be discriminated against for other than racial rea-
sons. It seems logical to conclude that Mexican Americans
could be one class of citizens who may not have been per-
ceived as a different race entirely but who were nevertheless a
different color. 7
Further support for the position that the Act was di-
45. Id. at 499.
46. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
47. The distinction between color and race was made by other Senators at the
time. Senatdr Davis, an opponent, noted:
Here the honorable Senator [Trumbull] in one short bill breaks down all
the domestic system of law that prevail in all the states, so far not only
as the negro, but as any man without regard to color is concerned ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Seas. 598 (1866).
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rected at eradicating discrimination against all traditionaly
deprived ethnic classes can be found in Senator Cowan's com-
ments on the operation of the Civil Rights bill. In the passage
below, Senator Cowan again speaks in terms of "races." He
may, however, actually be distinguishing between that race
that he labels "European" and all other peoples:
Mr. President, I am asking with quite an air of certainty
on the part of the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
whether the children of persons of barbarian races, born
in this country are not from that very fact citizens of this
country.... Who was it that established this Govern-
ment? They were people who brought here the charter of
their liberties with them .... By the terms of the char-
ters they were the actual possessors of the political power
of the colonies, and they alone had the right to say whom
they would admit to a co-enjoyment of that power with
them. It is true that the colonists of this country, when
they came here and established their governments, did
open the door... to men of their own race from Europe.
They opened it to the Irishman, they opened it to the
Germans, they opened it to the Scandinavian races of the
north. But where did they open it to the barbarian races
of Asia or of Africa? Nowhere.4 8
Cowan's understanding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
would give civil rights to those other than the "Europeans"
(the original incorporators of the United States) was well-
founded; no supporter of the Act ever disagreed with Cowan's
interpretation but only reiterated that the bill declared that
"all persons in the United States have the same civil rights." 4'
Moreover, Trumbull's statements about the general pur-
pose and effect of the Act" manifest a clear intention to elim-
inate all arbitrary class prejudice based on ethnic origin, not
just prejudice that is racially motivated. On April 4, 1866,
Senator Trumbull responded to President Johnson's veto of
the Civil Rights Act. Answering a charge that the Act discrim-
inated in favor of the Negroes, Trumbull replied,
Does that discriminate in favor of the colored people?
Why, sir, the very object and effect of the section is to
prevent discrimination, and language, it seems to me,
48. Id. at 499 (emphais added).
49. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
50. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
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could not more plainly express that object and effect. It
may be said that it is for the benefit of the black man
because he is now in some instances, discriminated
against by State laws; but that is the case with all reme-
dial statutes. They are for the relief of the persons who
need the relief .... ,5
Trumbull's statement suggests that he viewed the statute
as having a remedial function not confined to the particular
historical context in which it was set. Had he intended to con-
fine it to the Negro problem, he would not have been so ada-
mant about the fact that the statute did not discriminate in
favor of blacks. The statute is "for. . . [those] who need the
relief";5' there is nothing in the statute or in Trumbull's ex-
planation of it that limits those who may obtain "relief" to
victims of racial discrimination.
The conclusion, therefore, that the Civil Rights Act of
1866, and hence sections 1981 and 1982 of Title 42, extend to
Mexican American citizens is inescapable. While the immedi-
ate concern was the vindication of the civil rights of blacks,
Congress was well aware of the deprivations of civil rights suf-
fered by other ethnic groups. The statements concerning Gyp-
sies, Chinese, and Indians manifest an intent to provide a
cause of action for victims of ethnic-origin discrimina-
tion-cases where class members are not accorded the same
rights as the original European incorporators. The Mexican
American is undeniably a member of one of these groups.
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT:
THE BADGES OF SLAVERY CONCEPT
In the preceding pages, this comment established that
Congress, in 1866, intended its novel and forceful Civil Rights
Act to extend beyond the newly-free slaves to eradicate dis-
crimination against all ethnic groups that had been traditional
victims of discrimination by the white majority. As noted
above, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed pursuant to
section two, the enabling clause, of the thirteenth amendment
that empowers Congress to put into effect the substantive
provisions of the amendment.58 The question remains whether
51. Id. at 1758 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. For text of amendment, see note 9 supra.
[Vol. 20
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Congress, regardless of its intentions, had the authority to
reach non-racial classes under the thirteenth amendment. Af-
ter examining the Supreme Court's view of the extent of con-
gressional authority as well as various theories of constitu-
tional interpretation, this comment concludes that Congress is
empowered, via the thirteenth amendment, to eradicate pri-
vate discrimination against Mexican Americans."
Congress' powers to remedy discrimination under the
thirteenth amendment are delineated by the pseudonym "the
badges and incidents of slavery."" This concept first appeared
in the Slaughter House Cases," the first decision in which the
Court interpreted the anti-slavery amendment. The Court
stated, with respect to the amendment:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in
this protection. Both the language and spirit of these arti-
cles are to have their fair weight in any question of con-
struction. Undoubtedly, while negro slavery alone was in
the mind of Congress which proposed the thirteenth arti-
cle, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.
If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system
54. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was re-enacted in 1870 pursuant to Congress'
power under the fourteenth amendment. Congress undoubtedly has the power under
that amendment to protect non-racial classes. The fourteenth amendment, however,
carries with it a requirement of state action. Thus, in considering the question of
Congress' power to eradicate private discrimination against Mexican Americans, this
comment must focus on congressional authority under the thirteenth amendment.
On the other hand, it is clear that Congress has the power generally to reach
private discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, color, national origin, and sex.
Title VII, which addressed each of these grounds was passed pursuant to the com-
merce clause, and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Some courts have indi-
cated a willingness to construe liberally Congress' power to reach non-racial classes in
instances of private discrimination pursuant to the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments if power to do so exists somehwere else in the Constitution; others have not
been so willing. Compare Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Transp. Corp., 498 F.2d
641, n.32 (5th Cir. 1977)(even if Congress is not empowered to reach private discrimi-
nation against aliens under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, it can reach it
under its exclusive powers over naturalization and immigration and, therefore, section
1981 should be read to prohibit private discrimination in employment against aliens)
with DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (provision in section 1981 protecting aliens was passed pursuant to
fourteenth amendment only; thus, an alien must allege state action in order to main-
tain a cause of action for employment discrimination under section 1981).
55. Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 Hous. L. Rav. 1070, 1072-83 (1975).
56. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In the Slaughter House Cases, the Court sus-
tained a Louisiana legislative enactment establishing a slaughter house monopoly
against a thirteenth and fourteenth amendment attack.
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shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race
within our territory, this amendment may safely be
trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are as-
sailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall
within the protection of these articles, that protection
will apply, though the party interested may not be of Af-
rican descent."7
The early Supreme Court decisions narrowly construed
the power of Congress under section two of the thirteenth
amendment. Although conceding that Congress had the power
to "eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery," 58 the Court
in the Civil Rights Cases found that mere discrimination on
account of race or color was not a badge of slavery."' Eighty-
five years later in Jones, however, the Court recognized broad
congressional authority under the thirteenth amendment to
eliminate acts of private discrimination that do not amount to
slavery per se.60 According to the Court, the badges of slavery
include "restraints upon 'those fundamental rights which are
the essence of civil freedom... ' .",
Moreover, the Court in Jones stated, "Surely Congress
has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery,
and the authority to translate that determination into effec-
tive legislation."'6 Although the Jones Court assumed that
Congress' concern was with racial discrimination,"' note that
Senator Trumbull's conception of the "badges and incidents
of slavery" extended well beyond private acts of racial dis-
crimination. Trumbull asserted:
I take it that any statute which is not equal to all, and
which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are se-
cured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment on his
liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, by the
57. Id. at 72 (emphais added).
58. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
59. Id. at 21.
60. 392 U.S. at 437-43.
61. Id. at 441.
62. Id. at 440.
63. The Court in Jones began by noting that section 1982 was not a comprehen-
sive fair housing act, in that among other things, it did not address itself to discrimi-
nation on grounds of religion or national origin. But see text accompanying note 12
supra, discussing the significance of this dictum with regard to Mexican Americans.
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Constitution is prohibited."
Thus, to the extent that the Court is willing to defer to Con-
gress to determine what constitutes a badge of slavery, it is
clear that Congress did seek to eradicate civil rights discrimi-
nation against ethnic groups that are not necessarily deline-
ated by bright racial lines.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed the issue of whether Congress can extend the badges
of slavery concept to non-racial classes. The Court itself, how-
ever, extended the protection of section 1981 to whites in Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.'s In so doing, it
liberated thirteenth amendment interpretations from any re-
straints based on an intimate link with slavery as it actually
existed in the ante-bellum South. The Court has thereby
opened the door for the interpretation that the enabling
clause of the thirteenth amendment is a grant of expansive
remedial powers, allowing Congress to reach forms of discrim-
ination that are not necesarily the central thrust of the
amendment itself. In McDonald, the Court stated:
Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white cit-
izens would encounter substantial racial discrimination of
the sort proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure
and legislative history persuade us that the 39th Congress
was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader
principle than would have been necessary simply to
meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly
freed Negro slaves."
In light of the McDonald case, a strong equitable argu-
ment certainly exists in favor of extending protection to those
groups that have suffered from the same attitudes of white
supremacy that were at the root of the American slavery sys-
tem and the various kinds of discrimination against non-
whites that followed and still exist today.
While it is true that the substantive text of the thirteenth
amendment merely abolished slavery, Jones established that
the enabling clause permits Congress to reach conduct that is
not prohibited by section one, the self-executing force, of the
64. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
65. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
66. Id. at 295-96 (emphasis added).
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amendment. 7 This generous power accorded Congress to de-
fine the substantive scope of the amendment is limited only
by a requirement that the conduct prohibited bear a rational
relationship to a badge and incident of slavery.6 8 Legal schol-
ars have urged various theories of constitutional construction
which, when applied to the problem of the scope of congres-
sional authority under the thirteenth amendment, compel the
conclusion that Congress can "rationally" prohibit discrimina-
tion against non-racial ethnic groups.
General constitutional principles. The first of these theo-
ries depends primarily upon the Constitution's broad lan-
guage and concern for general categories."9 This theory, in ef-
fect, argues that the Constitution is composed of general
principles, rather than "minute specifications of its powers,"7 0
in order "to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of
which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Provi-
dence. 7 1 The Constitution thus bestows upon Congress the
power to "adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects
and to mould and to model the exercise of its powers, as its
own wisdom, and the public interest, should require."''7
In applying this first theory of construction to the thir-
teenth amendment, Professor Buchanan made the following
perceptive and persuasive argument:
Viewed accurately, slavery constituted class prejudice
writ large. In its functional impact, slavery institutional-
ized a particular form of class prejudice, prejudice based
on race. Spurred by this concrete manifestation of class
prejudice, the framers of the thirteenth amendment and
67. In Jones, the Court stated:
"By its own unaided force and effect," the Thirteenth Amendment
"abolished slavery, and established universal freedom." Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20. Whether or not the Amendment itself did any
more than that-a question not involved in this case-it is at least clear
that the Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do
much more. For that clause clothed "Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and indicents of
slavery in the United States." Ibid.
392 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 440.
69. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326-27 (1816). See Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
70. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 327.
[Vol. 20904
MEXICAN AMERICANS
the 1866 Act adopted language of general application not
confined to any particular species of evil they sought to
eliminate. This concern with general categories rather
than specific examples permeates the Constitution ....
[A] general clause should not be limited to the particular
historical condition that originally inspired its inclusion
in the document. The impelling historical condition can
inform constitutional construction; it need not constrict
it.75
Professor Buchanan concludes that Congress undoubtedly has
the power to reach non-racial classifications under the thir-
teenth amendment.
The Brest theory. A second theory of constitutional inter-
pretation that would support the position that Congress can
rationally define discrimination against Mexican Americans to
be a badge of slavery is delineated by Professor Brest.7 4 Pro-
fessor Brest disfavors the use of strict constructionist, or what
he labels "originalist," theories as the only acceptable means
of constitutional review.7 The originalist approaches to con-
stitutional construction, Brest asserts, suffer from the meth-
odological problems of ascertaining the substantive and inter-
pretive intent of the adopters7' and they often fail to further
the ends of constitutional government-the protection of the
democratic process and the rights of the individual."
Brest favors instead a theory of adjudication that treats
the text of the Constitution and its history as presumptively
73. Buchanan, supra note 55, at 1076-77.
74. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L.
Rav. 204 (1980).
75. Professor Brest identifies two types of originalist interpretation--strict in-
tentionalism and moderate originalism. The strict intentionalist construes phrases ex-
tremely narrow and precise. According to Brest moderate originalism forms the basis
of much of American constitutional interpretation. Under this theory, the text plays a
central role but is considered to be open-textured. Moreover, in assessing the original
understanding, the general purposes of the adopters rather than their specific inten-
tions with regard to the particular provision is the central concern. Id. at 204-05.
Yet, Brest claims that some central doctrines of constitutional law depend upon
non-originalist theories of adjudication. He cites as examples the incorporation of the
principles of equal protection into the fifth amendment, the incorporation of the Bill
of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, the more general notion of "substantive
due process," and the practice of judicial review of congressional enactments estab-
lished in Marbury v. Madison. Id. at 224-28.
76. Id. at 229.
77. Id. at 226.
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but not necessarily authoritative.7 Thus, an interpretation of
a constitutional provision derived from the language of the
text and its original understanding can be overcome in light of
changing public values.7' Professor Brest notes that this is
most likely to occur "in adjudication under broad clauses in-
volving issues of equality and liberty, where legal and moral
principles are closely intertwined," 80 as opposed to provisions
which are "contemporary and thus likely to reflect current
values and beliefs" or "where they specify the procedures and
numbers relating to elections, appointments to government
offices, and the formal validity of laws .... 81
The "non-originalist" theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion advanced by Professor Brest supports the view that Con-
gress can seek to eradicate discrimination against Mexican
Americans pursuant to its powers under the thirteenth
amendment. The amendment certainly qualifies as a "broad
clause" guaranteeing "individual liberties" where the pre-
sumption created by its text and original understanding may
be overcome. Thus, due to the pervasive discrimination
against Mexican Americans and the widely-held societal value
that discrimination against any ethnic group because of
ethnicity is unjust, a presumption that the thirteenth amend-
ment protects only purely racial groups because of the histori-
cal context of Southern slavery should be overcome in favor of
greater protection of the rights of the individual.
Furthermore, in Jones and McDonald, the Court recog-
nized that section two of the thirteenth amendment empow-
ered Congress to reach conduct that is not prohibited under
section one, the substantive provision, of the amendment. The
Court indicated a willingness to defer to Congress' determina-
tion of what constitutes a badge of slavery. The only limita-
tion on this power-rationality-has never been viewed as im-
posing serious restraints on congressional decisionmaking
authority.
Finally, strong equitable arguments in addition to well-
considered theories of constitutional interpretation favor the
proposition that Congress can prohibit private discrimination
against Mexican Americans pursuant to its thirteenth amend-
78. Id. at 228.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 229.
81. Id.
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ment powers.
RACE AS AN INADEQUATE AND DANGEROUS CLASSIFICATION
The preceding paragraphs have not exhausted all possible
arguments that can be made for the proposition that Mexican
American citizens are protected by sections 1981 and 1982.
The argument can and has been made that Mexican Ameri-
cans are victims of racial discrimination and therefore clearly
come within the ambit of the statutes.8 2 In Budinsky v. Corn-
ing Glass Works," the district court held that section 1981
did not proscribe discrimination based on national origin." In
dicta, however, the court argued that section 1981 should be
interpreted to prohibit discrimination against what may
"pragmatic[ally]" be deemed a race.88 The court stated:
The terms "race" and "racial discrimination" may be of
such doubtful sociological validity as to be scientifically
meaningless, but these terms nonetheless are subject to a
commonly-accepted, albeit sometimes vague, ,nderstand-
ing. These courts which have extended the coverage of §
1981 have done so on a realistic basis, within the frame-
work of this common meaning and understanding. On
this admittedly unscientific basis, whites are plainly a
"race" susceptible to "racial discrimination;" Hispanic
persons and Indians, like blacks, have been traditional
victims of group discrimination,- and, however inaccu-
rately or stupidly, are frequently and even commonly sub-
ject to a "racial" identification as "nonwhites." There is
accordingly both a practical need and a logical reason to
extend § 1981's proscription against exclusively "racial"
employment discrimination to these groups of potential
discriminatees.s
The "pragmatic" racial approach established in Budinsky
is in many ways similar to the approach advocated in the
preceeding sections of this comment. Most importantly, it rec-
ognizes the need to extend the protections of sections 1981
and 1982 to those who have been "traditional victims of group
82. See generally Greenfield and Kates, supra note 11.
83. 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
84. Id. at 789.
85. Id. at 788.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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discrimination. ' s7 Because of its adherence to the racial stan-
dard, however, it is more restrictive than the approach advo-
cated by this comment.88
The problem with the "pragmatic" racial approach of
Budinsky is that it is subject to varying interpretations. One
district court, citing Budinsky, found that discrimination
against Hispanic persons is based on national origin, not race,
and on that basis dismissed a section 1981 claim.8 ' In that
case, the plaintiff alleged discrimination in employment based
on his Puerto Rican heritage.9 The court, after an extensive
review of other federal decisions, stated that while
[r]ecognizing that Puerto Rican-Americans, Cuban-Amer-
icans, Mexican-Americans, and other Hispanic peoples
have at times undergone a discrimination like unto racial
discrimination, this Court is not prepared to hold that
Plaintiffs, being of Puerto Rican background, have stated
87. Id.
88. The more restrictive approach may hold greater appeal to the courts be-
cause of its manageability. For example, in Budinsky, the court refused to extend the
protection of the statute to Budinsky who was Slavic. The court stated:
These groups [Slavic, Italian, Jewish] are not so commonly identified as
"races" not so frequently subject to that "racial" discrimination which is
the specific and exclusive target of § 1981.
Id.
Undoubtedly, both the approach advocated in Budinsky and the one described
in this comment share the problem of a judicially-maneageable standard for deter-
mining who is a proper plaintiff. In this regard, it should first be noted that the lack
of a definitive test should be no reason for not adopting the approach; administrative
convenience is rarely perceived to be a sufficient obstacle to the effective enforcement
of civil rights. Secondly, there are many questions common in our jurisprudence that
involve less than a totally objective inquiry. For example, what precise standards
guide a jury in determining if the defendant in a negligence case acted as a reasonable
person, or in assessing the percentage of the plaintiff's fault in a comparative negli-
gence action?
One possible method by which courts can determine whether a particular plain-
tiff is a member of any ethnic group entitled to section 1981 protection would be to
consider sociological and historical evidence relevant to the experience of the particu-
lar group within the community in which the discrimination is alleged. This test is
not unlike that used by courts to determine if there a class entitled to equal treat-
ment under the fourteenth amendment. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
And it is important to consider that these restrictive, Budinsky-type approaches
are actually more difficult for the courts to administer. For example, a court applying
a "racial" standard would have to consider anthropological evidence relating to the
racial characteristics of the group and the attitudes within the community regarding
the race of the group. In light of the intent of the legislature that drafted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, this additional difficult inquiry is undesirable.
89. Vera v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 448 F. Supp. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
90. Id. at 612.
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a cause of action for racial discrimination, as required
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.91
Decisions like the one cited above highlight the need to
extend sections 1981 and 1982 beyond mere racial discrimina-
tion to other forms of discrimination that deprive any citizen
of his or her civil rights because he or she is not a member of
the more favored class of white citizens. Race, itself, is a dan-
gerous and elusive classification. As the district court noted in
LaFore v. Emblem Tape & Label Co.," the Encyclopedia
Britannica lists at least nine races, delineated by characteris-
tics such as blood traits, hair form, and chemical composi-
tion.93 More importantly, races are not static categories; some
races vanish altogether while new ones appear and existing
races merge." It is not within the capabilities of the courts to
make a scientific inquiry into the taxonomic characteristics of
each plaintiff suing under sections 1981 and 1982.
CONCLUSION
The framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were un-
doubtedly concerned with the vindication of civil rights of the
newly-freed slaves. While this was their immediate purpose,
the congressional debates indicate that the drafters of the Act
envisioned their action as extending well beyond the particu-
lar historical setting. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to ex-
tend to all citizens the rights that'were accorded white citi-
zens. This broad purpose, enunciated in the general language
of the Act, should certainly encompass Mexican Americans
who historically have been treated differently than the Euro-
pean incorporators. Thus, Mexican Americans and other per-
sons of Hispanic origin should be allowed to proceed under
sections 1981 and 1982 for the vindication of their civil rights.
Patricia Serventi
91. Id. at 613.
92. 448 F. Supp. 824 (D. Colo. 1978).
93. 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 984 (14th ed. 1973).
94. Id. at 986.
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